Loss Leading pricing is often referred to as an advertising strategy which allows retailers to attract consumers by subsidizing some products and make profits from other items; in this way, below-cost pricing may improve consumer welfare by compensating consumers for their lack of information. This paper shows that large retailers can instead use loss leading as an exploitative device at the detriment of smaller retailers, without any efficiency justification in terms of distribution cost or advertising. We show further that banning below-cost pricing can unambiguously increase consumer surplus and social welfare as well as smaller retailers' profit.
The last three decades have seen the emergence of large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, which provide a full line of groceries and allow consumers to fill their baskets in a single stop. The growing market power of these large retailers has caused serious concerns, not only about the impact of buyer power on the relations with suppliers, but also about the risk of distorted competition with smaller retailers such as discount stores, specialist grocery retailers and convenience stores. 1 One particular concern is caused by the adoption of so-called loss leading strategies. The practice consists in pricing selected "leader" products below cost, 2 in order to attract customers to the outlet and make profit on the other items sold therein. Loss leading has not been much studied in the economic literature and is subject to conflicting views in practice. In American Drugs vs. Wal-Mart Stores (1993) , for example, Wal-Mart was sued under Arkansas' Unfair Practice Act for below-cost pricing on certain pharmaceuticals. Wal-Mart lost the initial trial, the Court finding that intent to injure competitors and destroy competition could be inferred from circumstances such as the number and extent of below cost sales. Wal-Mart however won on appeal in the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which stated that "the loss-leader strategy employed by Conway Wal-Mart is readily justifiable as a tool to foster competition and to gain a competitive edge as opposed to simply being viewed as a stratagem to eliminate rivals all together." 3 Yet in Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil (2003) , a preliminary injunction was granted under Oklahoma's Unfair Sales Act, prohibiting below cost sales of gasoline by Sam's East, a Wal-Mart subsidiary selling groceries in a wholesale club format. The court ruled that pricing below cost was prima facie evidence of intent to harm competitors as well as of a tendency to dampen competition. 4 1 See for example the reports of the US Federal Trade Commission (2001 , 2003 , the proceedings of the FTC conference held on May 24, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/grocery/index.shtm, or the groceries market enquiries of the UK Competition Commission (2000, 2008) recommending codes of practices. In France, these concerns triggered the adoption of two Acts in 1996, respectively aimed at curbing the expansion of large retailers as well as the exploitation of their market power; a series of new laws and regulations have again been put in place over the last three years. 2 In its recent report on the grocery market, the UK Competition Commission notes for example that most large retailers were engaged in below-cost selling, concentrated in two to three product lines but representing up to 3% of a retailer's total revenue. See Competition Commission (2008) at p. 94. 3 See Boudreaux (1996) for details. 4 Star Fuel Marts, LLC. v. Murphy Oil, Inc., No. CIV-02-2002 -F (W.D. Okla.2003 (order granting preliminary European national laws. Legal restrictions on below-cost resale have been adopted in Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, but not in Denmark, Germany, or Italy, although a few cases have centered on this practice there as well. 5 In the absence of specific regulations, practitioners have approached loss leading with predatory pricing analytical frameworks. 6 However in most cases it is difficult to establish recoupment, making predation scenarios unlikely. In its recent report, the UK Competition Commission for example concludes: "We find that the pattern of below-cost selling that we observed by large grocery retailers does not represent behavior that was predatory in relation to other grocery retailers." 7 Moreover, there is no solid economic analysis that relates loss leading to predatory pricing. It has instead been viewed as an optimal pricing strategy by a multiproduct firm, who can find it profitable to cross-subsidize goods with different demand elasticities; 8 it has also been identified as a featuring or advertising strategy, 9 suggesting that below-cost pricing may compensate consumers for their imperfect information and may improve consumer surplus. 10 This paper shows that loss leading can be an effective exploitative device, which large retailers can use at the detriment of smaller rivals and consumers. We consider a simple setting where a large retailer enjoys a monopoly position for some products but faces competition from a more efficient small retailer on other goods. Consumers vary only in their shopping costs, timeconstrained consumers having a stronger preference for one-stop shopping. In order to set aside injunction). 5 For instance, in 2000 the German Cartel Office ordered Wal Mart, Aldi and Lidl to stop selling below cost staples such as milk or butter, arguing that this could impair competition and force smaller retailers out of the market.
6 See e.g. Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (2000) and Eckert and West (2003) for detailed discussions of such frameworks.
7 See Competition Commission (2008), Page.98. Applying predatory pricing tests would often require that the practice not only harm smaller retailers, but also the large retailer would have sufficient market power afterwards to recoup the losses incurred during the predation phase. The Competition Commision finds that both conditions are unlikely to be met in the case of loss leading practices.
8 See Bliss (1988) . 9 Lal and Matutes (1994) consider for example a situation where multiproduct firms compete for consumers who are initially unaware of prices, and find that in equilibrium firms may indeed choose to advertise a few loss leaders in order to increase store traffic. the advertising and cross-subsidizing effects mentioned above, consumers are supposed to be fully informed about prices and homogenous in their valuations of the goods -they however differ in their net valuations, taking into account shopping costs. In the absence of the rival, the large retailer would charge monopoly prices exploiting the demand derived from one-stop shopping. When the retailer competes instead with a rival who can distribute some of the goods at a lower cost, the less time-constrained consumers prefer to buy the competitive goods from the smaller store, while still purchasing the monopolized goods at the large store. The large retailer can also keep attracting those consumers who, having relatively high shopping costs, prefer to buy the full range of products from the same store. As long as the cost advantage of the smaller rival's remains small, compared with the value of the broader range of products offered by the large retailer, the large retailer chooses to price the competitive products below cost and increase the price of the monopolized goods. Keeping constant the overall assortment price actually allows the large retailer to obtain the same monopoly rents as before from one-stop shoppers, while extracting some additional rents from multi-stop shoppers, who only buy the monopolized products from it; in this way, the large retailer makes even more profit than in the absence of the rival.
Loss leading thus allows the large retailer to discriminate multi-stop shoppers, who only buy the monopolized goods from the large retailer, from one-stop shoppers, who also purchase the competitive goods from the larger store. While loss leading increases the large retailer's profit, this is achieved at the expense of the rival retailer. Our analysis thus validates the often voiced concern that large retailers' market power distort retail competition and harm smaller rivals.
However, this is more a by-product of the discrimination strategy than the primary motivation. Indeed, loss leading remains an optimal strategy when the competitive goods are supplied by a fringe, whose profits are then unaffected by the strategy. In addition, since the large retailer makes more profit than in the case of pure monopoly, it has no incentive to exclude the more efficient small retailers; it prefers to have them around, but at the same time its discrimination strategy is more effective when they are hurt. Loss leading thus appears here as an exploitative device rather than an exclusionary practice. 11 Simply noting that the smaller retailer remains active should not lead to conclude that loss leading is an innocuous strategy, however. A ban on 1 1 Marx and Shaffer (1999) label such below-cost pricing practice as predatory accommodation without exclusion.
They study a rent-shifting setting à la Aghion-Bolton (1987) , in which a retailer negotiates sequentially with suppliers of substitute products; below-cost pricing by one supplier allows the retailer to extract rents from the remaining suppliers. In this context, the welfare effects of below-cost pricing is however ambiguous. loss leading would hurt the large retailer but benefit consumers (as well as smaller rivals) and, as result, would increase social welfare. 12 While we develop these insights in a simple setting in which consumers have discrete demands and homogenous valuations for the goods, we show in the supplementary appendix that loss leading can remain an effective discrimination device when consumers have heterogenous preferences for either the competitive or the non-competitive goods. This paper is closely related to the literature on competitive pricing by multi-product firms in the presence of consumer shopping cost. Armstrong and Vickers (2009) consider for example a symmetric duopoly à la Hotelling in which consumers have heterogeneous and elastic demands for two products and incur an additional shopping cost when dealing with both suppliers; they show that the existence of an equilibrium in which firms price all products above cost but offer conditional discounts (mixed bundling). Ambrus and Weinstein (2008) study Bertrand competition among symmetric firms competing for one-stop shoppers. They first show that loss leading cannot occur when consumers have inelastic demand. When demand is elastic, loss leading can occur but only under rather specific forms of demand complementarity; in particular, loss leading cannot arise when consumer demand is sufficiently diverse. In contrast to these papers, we focus on asymmetric competition between a multi-product firm and a singleproduct firm, and on heterogenous shopping costs among consumers; loss leading then emerges as an effective way to discriminate one-stop shoppers from multi-stop shoppers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model for retail competition between a large retailer and smaller retailer in the presence of heterogenous shopping costs. Section 3 then shows that the equilibrium is unique and involves loss leading whenever the large retailer has a sufficient competitive advantage. Section 4 derives the policy implications and section 5 concludes. 1 2 Allain and Chambolle (2005) show however that manufacturers can take advantage of laws banning loss leading to maintain higher prices and profits; banning below-cost pricing may then have a perverse effect on consumer welfare. is a large retailer, such as a supermarket which offers a broad range of products, while retailer 2 (denoted by R 2 ) is a smaller retailer, such as a discount store, which offers a narrower range of products at a lower cost. For the sake of exposition, we will simply assume that there are two products, A and B; product A is only offered by retailer 1, while product B is offered by both retailers. 13 R 1 incurs a marginal cost c A for distributing product A, as well as a marginal cost c 1 for product B, while R 2 faces a lower cost for distributing product B, c 2 < c 1 ; we denote by
Each consumer obtains a utility u A or u B when buying A or B respectively, and gets a utility u AB ≤ u A + u B when consuming both products. 14 We first assume that all consumers have the same valuations for good A and B, as well as for the bundle; we will also consider later on the case where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over these products. Each consumer wishes to buy one unit of each product, and shopping once costs the consumer one unit of time, which includes the time for traffic, parking, as well as selecting and checking out.
The perceived cost of this shopping time, denoted by t, varies across persons and is characterized by a cumulative distribution function G(·), with a density function g(·) and an inverse hazard rate h(·) ≡ G(·)/g(·) which is assumed to be strictly increasing.
The assumption that consumers have the same preferences allows us to avoid cross-subsidization stemming from differences in demand elasticities, as studied by Bliss (1988) ; we show in the supplementary appendix that our analysis is robust to consumers having heterogeneous preferences over product A or B.
Consumers choose retailers based on the considerations of (1) the value of assortments, (2) prices, and (3) transactional conveniences relating to shopping time. The assumption on heterogeneous shopping costs reflect the fact that the value of time varies across persons, and some consumers are less time-constrained than others. Our framework builds in this way on Armstrong and Vickers (2009), in which consumers incur additional shopping cost for approaching a second firm, and the shopping cost can also vary across consumers. R 1 and R 2 simultaneously set their prices, (p A , p 1 ) and p 2 respectively. 15 Consumers observe all prices and then make shopping decisions. A consumer faces four relevant options: (1) not shopping, which brings a reservation utility 0; (2) buying both products from R 1 ; (3) buying B only from R 2 ; and (4) buying A from R 1 and B from R 2 . 16 Purchasing both products from the large retailer yields a value v A1 ≡ u AB − p A − p 1 , and a consumer is willing to do so only if this value exceeds the shopping cost: t ≤ v A1 . By analogy, a consumer is willing to buy B only from R 2 if t ≤ v 2 ≡ u B − p 2 . Alternatively, a consumer can choose to buy A from R 1 and B from R 2 if p 2 < p 1 , and this multi-stop shopping brings a value v A2 ≡ u AB − p A − p 2 at the expense of a double shopping cost 2t, so this can happen only if
To simplify exposition, we will use retail margins, denoted by r A ≡ p A − c A , r 1 ≡ p 1 − c 1 , and r 2 ≡ p 2 − c 2 , rather than prices as strategic variables for the retailers. In addition, let
, and w A ≡ u A − c A denote the social welfare (gross of shopping costs) generated from the supply of product B by R 1 and R 2 , as well as from the supply of A by R 1 , and also denote by w A1 ≡ u AB − c A − c 1 the total welfare that R 1 can bring. We assume that it is always socially desirable for R 1 to supply another product on top of selling A or B, that is, w A1 > w A and w A1 > w 1 . 17 Finally, let ∆ ≡ w A1 − w 2 = w A1 − w 1 − γ denote the competitive advantage of the large retailer. We are interested in the case where the large retailer dominates the local market, and will therefore assume ∆ > 0. 18 Given the values of different shopping plans, we can characterize the demand that the retailers face. Notice that the large retailer R 1 attracts one-stop shoppers when it offers more values than its rival, that is, when v A1 ≥ v 2 ; in this case (denoted as regime L) R 2 can only attract multistop shoppers who buy A from R 1 and B from R 2 , and this is the case if
that is, when the extra gain from multi-stop shopping offsets the additional shopping cost:
We consider linear and unbundled pricing here. We show later that the large retailer cannot benefit from pure or mixed bundling.
1 6 We will see that R 2 always charges a price p 2 ≤ p 1 ≤ u B in equilibrium; therefore a consumer never buys only B or only A from R1.
where τ represents the value of time that leaves the consumer indifferent between one-stop shopping and multi-stop shopping. In regime L, consumers are willing to visit the large retailer if t ≤ v A1 , while they would rather visit both stores if t ≤ τ . 19 The large retailer thus attracts a demand G(v A1 ) − G(τ ) for both products from one-stop shoppers, and an additional demand G(τ ) for product A from multi-stop shoppers; in contrast, the small retailer faces a demand G(τ ) from multi-stop shoppers. So, in regime L, the large retailer makes a profit
where r A1 ≡ r A + r 1 is the total retail margin, while the small retailer obtains a profit
If instead the small retailer could offer more value than the large retailer, that is, if v 2 > v A1 , it could attract one-stop shoppers to purchase in its outlet. In this case (denoted as regime S), one-stop shoppers are willing to patronize the small retailer as long as t ≤ v 2 , while multi-stop shoppers would rather visit both stores when t ≤ v A ≡ u AB − u B − p A . In regime S, R 2 then faces a total demand G(v 2 ) from both one-stop shoppers and multi-stop shoppers, and thus earns a profit
whereas R 1 only faces a demand G(v A ) for A only from multi-stop shoppers, and makes a profit
Benchmark: monopoly
As a benchmark, we consider here the case where the large retailer is a monopolist for both products. Since u B > c 1 and u A > c A by assumption, it is profitable to sell both products and a consumer will buy as long as t ≤ v A1 ; the monopolist retailer thus faces a demand G(v A1 ) and makes a profit r A1 G(v A1 ). The monopoly total margin r m A1 is then characterized by the first-order condition: 20
1 9 Notice that this regime includes the cases τ = 0 (no multi-stop shopper) and τ = vA1 (no one-stop shopper).
2 0 The profit function is strictly quasi-concave when the hazard rate h(·) is increasing, as proved in Appendix A.
or, noting that l(x) ≡ x + h(x) is increasing in x, it can be written as
The monopoly profit of the large retailer is then:
).
Loss leading
We now consider regime L, in which the large retailer attracts one-stop shoppers by offering more value than its rival: v A1 > v 2 . Differentiating Π 2 = r 2 G(τ ) = r 2 G(γ + r 1 − r 2 ) with respect to r 2 , we can characterize the small retailer's best response by the first-order condition 21
Likewise, differentiating
respect to r A1 and r 1 provide the first-order conditions for the best response of the large retailer:
Since the first-order condition for the total margin r A1 coincides with (1), the large retailer still charges the monopoly retail margin for the bundle of products; that is, the equilibrium margin is r A1 = r m A1 . But the retail margin of the competitive product B is here negative: In equilibrium, r L 1 = −r L 2 = −r L , where r L is the unique solution to r = h(γ − 2r), therefore the large retailer adopts a loss leading strategy and prices B below cost. This can be understood as follows. Notice that all combinations of margins r A and r 1 such that r A +r 1 = r m A1 generate the same profit from one-stop shoppers, but yield different profit from multi-stop shoppers. Charging a price below-cost for product B (that is, r 1 < 0) actually allows the large retailer to increase its margin on the non-competitive product above the monopolistic level: the equilibrium margin satisfies r A = r m A1 − r 1 > r m A1 ; the large retailer therefore reaps a higher profit from the multi-stop shoppers, who only buy A from it. This extra profit from multi-stop shoppers is exactly −r 1 G(τ ). While decreasing r 1 allows R 1 to further increase its 2 1 Second-order conditions are checked in the Appendix A. margin on the monopolized good, it also reduces the population G (τ ) of multi-stop shoppers (that is, it decreases τ ), which leads to the above first-order condition.
In this candidate equilibrium, loss leading allows the large retailer to extract an extra rent −r 1 G(τ ) = G(τ )h(τ ) from the small retailer. The equilibrium threshold τ L , is then determined by the condition:
where j(x) ≡ x + 2h(x) is strictly increasing. It follows that in equilibrium the small retailer
while the large retailer obtains
which is higher than the monopolistic profit Π m 1 . For the above retail margins to form an equilibrium, two conditions must be satisfied: First, the large retailer must indeed attract one-stop shoppers, i.e. v A1 > v 2 ; that is, its retail margin r A1 must be sufficiently lower than its rival's margin r 2 , taking into account its competitive advantage ∆:
Second, whereas the large retailer earns a higher profit than the monopoly level, and thus has no incentive to exclude the rival, the small retailer may want to attract one-stop shoppers by reducing its retail margin to r 2 ≤ r m A1 − ∆. In Appendix B, we show that it is then optimal for the small retailer to charge r d 2 = r m A1 − ∆, which brings a profit equal to
). Thus, the small retailer cannot benefit from this deviation if:
This condition can be written as
which implies that the large retailer's retail margin r m A1 must be lower than the "weighted" retail margin of the small retailer,
) , in addition to its competitive advantage ∆. Since v m A1 > τ L , this equilibrium constraint is indeed more stringent than condition (6), and is thus the only relevant condition. Rearrange equation (7), we obtain:
which can be written as
where, as shown in Appendix B, Ψ(γ) is increasing in γ. It follows that the optimal retail margins form an equilibrium if 22
We now show that regime S, in which one-stop shoppers patronize the small retailer, i.e.
v 2 > v A1 , cannot arise in equilibrium when ∆ > 0. In this regime, the large retailer faces a demand G(v A ) for product A only from multi-stop shoppers, and thus makes a profit equal to r A G(v A ). Suppose now the large retailer attracts one-stop shoppers by undercutting the small retailer on product B, that is, by reducing r 1 (keeping r A and thus v A constant) so as to offer
. This does not change the number of multi-stop shoppers since
and from those consumers the large retailer charges the same retail margin, r A , as before. But it attracts one-stop shoppers (those for which v A ≤ t ≤ v ′ A1 = v 2 ) on which it earns a profit margin equals to
Since the equilibrium requires r 2 ≥ 0, the condition ∆ > 0 thus implies that this deviation is profitable.
Finally, we show in Appendix B that no equilibrium can arise at the boundary of the two regimes, i.e, v A1 = v 2 , in which case one-stop shoppers are indifferent between visiting R 1 or R 2 . Since the condition ∆ > 0 can be written as γ < γ 2 ≡ w A1 − w 1 , we have:
Proposition 1 When the small retailer's cost advantage is relatively small, namely, when γ ≤ γ ≡ min{γ 1 , γ 2 }, there exists a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, in which the large retailer adopts a loss-leading strategy: the large retailer offers the competitive product at a price below-cost, while keeping the total price for both products at the monopoly level; as a result, the large retailer earns more profit than in the absence of the rival.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Loss leading thus emerges as an effective discrimination device. It allows the large retailer to charge higher prices to multi-stop shoppers for the monopolized goods, while maintaining the same overall price to one-stop shoppers. While this strategy hurts the rival, it is not intentional; rather, the large retailer finds it optimal to respond to the rival's price by pricing the competitive good below cost. The same would hold if good B were supplied by a competitive fringe. Suppose for example that several, equally efficient rivals, compete in the distribution of good B. They would then sell this good at price p B = c 2 , and would thus obtain zero profit, whatever prices are offered by the large retailer. Yet R 1 , seeking to maximize
would still find it optimal to price B below cost -the optimal margin r 1 would satisfy r 1 = −h (γ + r 1 ).
Tying and Bundled Discount
Since R 2 sells only B, and is better placed than R 1 for doing so, in equilibrium the consumers who visit R 1 buy there either A only or both A and B. Thus, while in principle R 1 could engage in mixed bundling and offer A and B on a stand-alone basis, at prices p A and p 1 , as well as a discounted price p A1 for the bundle A+B, in equilibrium it only needs to offer two options, which can be presented as p A = c A + r A for A and p 1 = c 1 + r 1 for B, or as p A for A and p A1 = p A + p 1 for A + B. Offering both options dominated pure bundling (i.e., offering only A + B at some price p A1 ), however, as it allows R 1 to discriminate multi-stop shoppers (i.e., those consumers who face lower shopping costs from one-stop shoppers. In the above equilibrium, the loss leading strategy actually provides a very effective discrimination tool, which allows the large retailer to earn more than the monopoly profit; it follows that foreclosing the market through strategic tying or (pure) bundling could not be profitable, since the large retailer could not obtain more than the monopoly profit in case of exclusion. 23 
Uniform Distribution: An Example
To illustrate our analysis, suppose that the shopping cost t is uniformly distributed so that G(x) = x. The first-order conditions then boil down to r 2 = −r 1 = τ , and r A1 = v A1 , which, using v A1 = w A1 − r A1 and τ = γ − (r 2 − r 1 ) = γ − 2τ , yield
The equilibrium margins are thus equal to
The small retailer obtains
which is increasing in its cost advantage γ, whereas the large retailer obtains
which is higher than the monopolistic level
4 . Finally,
and it is positive whenever w A1 > 2w 1 , in which case the equilibrium exists whenever γ ≤ γ 1 . 24
Ban of Loss Leading: Welfare Analysis
The previous analysis shows that loss leading is a profitable strategy for the large retailer, who in this way obtains an even higher profit than in a pure monopoly situation. We now show that this is achieved at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.
Suppose that the large retailer is not allowed to charge prices below cost. It would then optimally charge r 1 = 0 for product B and thus obtains a profit r A1 G(v A1 ). 25 In equilibrium, the large retailer then earns the monopoly profit Π m 1 , by charging r A = r m A1 , while the small retailer maximizes its profit by charging r 2 = h(τ ), where τ = γ − (r 2 − r 1 ) = γ − h(τ ). The equilibrium threshold for the shopping cost, below which consumers would prefer multi-shopping, is then: 26
Since l −1 (γ) > j −1 (γ), it follows that τ b > τ L and thus the small retailer, facing higher demand from multi-stop shoppers, makes more profit:
. 27 While one-stop 2 4 It can be checked that w A1 > 2w 1 implies γ = γ 1 < γ 2 .
2 5 This can be seen by noting that Π1 = rA1G(wA1 − rA1) − r1G(γ + r1 − r2), and thus charging any r1 > 0 is strictly dominated.
2 6 We employ the superscript b to refer to the case when below-cost pricing is banned.
2 7 It suffices to note that both h(·) and G(·) are increasing with τ .
shoppers face the same monopoly price as before so that their surplus v A1 is not affected, multistop shoppers actually benefit from a ban of below-cost pricing as
It follows that banning loss-leading increases total consumer surplus (since it increases the option value for multi-stop shoppers, without affecting the value of one-stop shopping).
Formally, social welfare can be expressed as a function of τ as follows:
where, in the first line, the first term represents the total social welfare from one-stop shopping while the second term is the social welfare from multi-stop shopping; and the second line follows
, it follows that social welfare is increasing in τ :
, since both τ L and τ b are less than γ. Therefore a ban of loss-leading increases social welfare. In particular, this tends to reduce the inefficiency in distribution the small retailer now serves more efficiently the consumers whose shopping cost lies between τ L and τ b .
When below-cost pricing is prohibited, the large retailer still makes a profit equal to the monopoly level; it therefore has no incentives to exclude the rival. These findings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume γ ≤ γ and below-cost pricing is banned. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the large retailer sells the competitive good at cost and makes the monopoly profit on the other good; the small retailer's profit, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher than in the case when below-cost pricing is allowed.
Proof. See Appendix C.
While most countries have laws equipped to deal with predatory pricing by a multiproduct retailer, competition authorities have been reluctant to apply them to loss leading. For instance, in its 1997 report, the UK Office of Fair Trading argues that in the analysis of the alleged predation in retailing cases, a price-cost comparison will be of little use, since pricing below cost on individual items may be profitable without being predatory. In this 2000 and 2008 reports, the UK Competition Commission similarly argues that the necessary conditions for an alleged predation are unlikely to be met in loss leading cases.
Our analysis shows that loss leading can be used as an exploitative practice by a dominant retailer, so as to extract rents from a smaller but more efficient rival, rather than as an exclusionary or predatory device to foreclose the market; banning loss leading could then increase consumer surplus and social welfare. These findings thus provide a theoretical ground for the evaluation of anticompetitive effects in loss leading cases.
Conclusions
Loss leading pricing strategy is commonly adopted by multi-product retailers. It is often referred to as an advertising strategy which allows retailers to attract consumers by subsidizing some products and make profits from other items; in this way, below-cost pricing may improve consumer welfare by compensating consumers for their lack of information. This paper shows that large retailers can instead use loss leading as an exploitative device at the detriment of smaller retailers, without any efficiency justification in terms of distribution cost or advertising.
We show further that banning below-cost pricing can then unambiguously increase consumer surplus and social welfare as well as smaller retailers' profits.
Our analysis also underlies some of the key ingredients for loss leading to be used as such an exploitative device. In particular, a retailer must offer a range of products that is sufficiently valuable to offset any cost advantages that its smaller but more focused rivals may enjoy, and de facto confer a leading position in the market.
Finally, while our analysis sheds a first light on the possible exploitative use of loss leading, it does so in the confine of a rather stylized framework, in which the large retailer enjoys a monopoly situation on some of the goods offered to consumers. The extent to which the analysis carries over to different situations, where the large retailer faces (imperfect) competition on these goods, either from other large retailers, or from alternative smaller outlets which focus on these goods, remains an avenue for further research.
Appendices
Appendix A: Quasi-concavity of Profit Functions
We check here the quasi-concavity of profit functions. In the monopoly case, the large retailer makes a profit
Differentiating with respect to r A1 , we obtain
The first-order condition thus boils down to
which has a unique solution r m A1 since φ is strictly decreasing. This solution is moreover a global maximum since
In regime L, the profit function of the large retailer can be written as
Using the same argument as above, the terms r A1 G(w A1 − r A1 ) and −r 1 G(γ + r 1 − r 2 ) are quasi-concave in, respectively, r A1 and −r 1 . It follows that the unique local optimum, given by
, is also a global maximum and therefore constitute R 1 's unique and best response to r 2 . Similarly, the R 2 's best response, which maximizes Π 2 = r 2 G(γ + r 1 − r 2 ), is the unique solution to r 2 = h(γ + r 1 − r 2 ). Therefore, in regime L, the candidate equilibrium is characterized by equation (3), (4), and (5).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
We first characterize the conditions in regime L under which R 2 cannot gain from attracting one-stop shoppers, before studying the boundary case v A1 = v 2 . By offering v 2 ≥ v A1 so as to attract one-stop shoppers, R 2 obtains Π 2 (r 2 ) = r 2 G(w 1 + γ − r 2 ), which is maximized for r 2 = r S 2 , characterized by
Since r 1 < w 1 and h(·) is increasing, r S 2 > r L 2 = h(r 1 + γ − r L 2 ), that is, r S 2 exceeds R 2 's margin in the candidate equilibrium in regime L, therefore the optimal deviation is achieved at the boundary of the two regimes: r 2 = r m A1 − ∆. As noted in the text, this implies that
Differentiating Ψ(γ) with respect to γ and using the relation
we obtain
Therefore Ψ(·) is strictly increasing and the equilibrium condition can be further written as
where Ψ −1 is the inverse function of Ψ.
Finally, consider the boundary of the two regimes, in which v A1 = v 2 and one-stop shoppers are indifferent between visiting R 1 or R 2 . Note first that there must exist some active consumers, otherwise either retailer could attract consumers by reducing its retail margin. Suppose now that all consumers are multi-stop shoppers, in which case R 1 only sells A while R 2 sells B to all consumers; we must therefore have v 1 = 0 or r 1 = w 1 > 0. But it is then profitable for R 1 to transform some multi-stop shoppers into one-stop shoppers by reducing slightly the margin on B to r ′ 1 = r 1 − ε > 0, while keeping r A unchanged: this brings an extra gain from selling product B to one-stop shoppers, equal to r ′ 1 (G(v ′ A1 ) − G(τ )) > 0. Therefore some consumers must be one-stop shoppers.
Suppose now some one-stop shoppers visit R 2 . We must then have r 2 ≥ 0, and v A1 = v 2 thus implies that r A1 = r 2 + ∆ > r 2 ≥ 0; it follows that all one-stop shoppers must patronize R 1 , otherwise it will be profitable for R 1 to reduce r A1 to r ′ A1 = r A1 − ε so as to attract all one-stop shoppers (as v ′ A1 > v 2 ). Therefore, all one-stop shoppers must go to R 1 . Conversely, we must have r 2 ≤ 0, otherwise R 2 can benefit from reducing its margin to r ′ 2 = r 2 − ε so as to attract all one-stop shoppers. Therefore, in any candidate equilibrium such that v A1 = v 2 , either:
• There are some multi-stop shoppers (i.e. τ > 0) and thus r 2 = 0; but then slightly increasing r 2 would allow R 2 to keep attracting some multi-stop shoppers and obtain a positive profit, a contradiction.
• Or all consumers buy both products from R 1 , i.e. τ ≤ 0, which implies r 1 ≤ r 2 − γ ≤ −γ < 0. But then increasing r 1 to r ′ 1 = r 2 − γ + ε while reducing r A by the same amount (such that r A1 keeps constant) would lead those consumers with t < τ ′ = ε to buy B from R 2 , allowing R 1 to avoid a subsidy r 1 for them.
